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Abstract. Ransomware can produce direct and controllable economic
loss, which makes it one of the most prominent threats in cyber security.
As per the latest statistics, more than half of malwares reported in Q1 of
2017 are ransomwares and there is a potent threat of a novice cybercrim-
inals accessing ransomware-as-a-service. The concept of public-key based
data kidnapping and subsequent extortion was introduced in 1996. Since
then, variants of ransomware emerged with different cryptosystems and
larger key sizes, the underlying techniques remained same. Though there
are works in literature which proposes a generic framework to detect
the crypto ransomwares, we present a two step unsupervised detection
tool which when suspects a process activity to be malicious, issues an
alarm for further analysis to be carried in the second step and detects it
with minimal traces. The two step detection framework- RAPPER uses
Artificial Neural Network and Fast Fourier Transformation to develop a
highly accurate, fast and reliable solution to ransomware detection us-
ing minimal trace points. We also introduce a special detection module
for successful identification of disk encryption processes from potential
ransomware operations, both having similar characteristics but with dif-
ferent objective. We provide a comprehensive solution to tackle almost all
scenarios (standard benchmark, disk encryption and regular high com-
putational processes) pertaining to the crypto ransomwares in light of
software security.
Keywords: Ransomware, Hardware Performance Counters, Time-Series,
Fast Fourier Transformation, Autoencoder, Long-Short-Term-Memory
1 Introduction
If your organization has not been hit by ransomwares yet, there are chances
that it will soon be. The number of medium to large-scale enterprise falling
prey to ransom payment and extortion of their private databases have increased
manifold. These malicious executables infect victim machines and demand a
ransom amount after encrypting files and documents of the device. In May 2017,
WannaCry ransomware has affected approximately 400,000 machines across 150
countries [3]. Identification, blocking of these ransomwares at the earliest along
with recovering contents of already encrypted files is already an open challenge.
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) were first introduced for checking
the static and dynamic integrity of programs to detect any malicious modifica-
tions to them as discussed in [11]. While in [4] performance counters are used
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to build a malware detector in hardware. Detecting malware which modifies the
kernel control flow has been targeted in [14], [15]. These papers use performance
counters to monitor system calls for identifying the vulnerabilities. However, de-
tection of ransomwares through the HPCs, to the best of our knowledge, has
not been attempted so far. Though the underlying technique is similar [13], ran-
somware detection requires far more accuracy and faster response time to limit
the damage.
A range of ransomwares were studied in [8], which identified 15 different ran-
somware families. It is suggested that despite advancing encryption systems, the
prominent ransomwares leave a trait in the access of I/O and file-systems. Ac-
cordingly, Kharraz et al. [7] proposed a technique of correlating high file system
activities with the intrusion of ransomwares, which, however, is susceptible to
false positives and also can be defeated with a slow encryption process. More-
over, the technique requires modification in Operating System kernel, which may
not be practical in many real-life scenarios. In a recent work, Kiraz et al. [9] pre-
sented a method, where large integer multiplication blocks are identified within
an execution. Since public-key cryptosystems rely on large integer multiplica-
tions, it can detect the threat at an early stage. Similar approaches for detection
of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives via data flow graph isomorphism [10]
or by identifying characteristics of a cipher in a binary code [5] are also pre-
sented. In this paper, neither we target a specific family of ransomwares nor the
properties corresponding to a particular cipher implementation used by a ran-
somware. Instead, we develop a generic anomaly-based approach based on the
HPC statistics.
A major difficulty in any ransomware detection approach is to differentiate
between a benign disk encryption process and a ransomware executable. While
both of them serve the same objective, but the latter being unintended and
malicious one. Most of the popular disk encryption applications require admin-
istrative privilege and use similar algorithms in their encryption operation. In
this paper, we utilize this fact and try to address the harder problem to dif-
ferentiate between a disk encryption program and a ransomware not only by
checking the privilege of a program but also by observing its behavior in terms
of hardware performance counters. We also present a simple yet efficient method
to recover the files encrypted by a ransomware before its detection by utilizing
the Linux file locking mechanism using mlock() system call.
Motivation and Contribution
The primary contributions of this paper are listed below:
– Main objective of RAPPER is to learn the behavior of system under observation
with performance event statistics obtained from HPCs. Unlike other works in lit-
erature, which save the templates of malicious processes and matches it on its
occurrence, here we allow our tool to learn the normal operating behavior of the
system. The time-series data as observed from a selected cluster of HPC events is
fed to an Artificial Neural Network to learn the specific characteristics of the data.
– Any deviation from this normal behavior as learned by the Autoencoder is con-
sidered as a suspect to RAPPER. We observed that the performance statistics of
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the system in presence of ransomware are significantly dissimilar from the normal
system behavior because of repeated encryption process.
– In the course of our study, we came across a benchmark application, though benign
in nature, raised an alarm. This is a typical example of a benign process, which
due to its high computational overhead differs significantly from normal system
behavior, thus raising a false alarm.
– On such an alarm, we transform the time series into frequency domain using Fast
Fourier Transformation (FFT) and understand the repeatability of data with the
help of a second autoencoder.
– We also explore the performance of RAPPER in the presence of disk encryption
programs, which are benign in nature having similar behavior as ransomwares, and
devised a correlation based approach to differentiate between these two processes.
RAPPER is a lightweight tool, which does not require any hardware or kernel
modification, thereby making it practical to use in almost every environment.
2 Anomaly Detection by Analysing the System Behavior
In this section, we first analyze the normal behavior3 of a system by monitoring
some appropriately selected hardware performance counter events in parallel.
We then present a notion of anomalous activity in the system and demonstrate
a detailed methodology for detecting those anomalies by using an Autoencoder.
2.1 Observing the System Behavior using HPCs
The Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) are a set of special purpose regis-
ters built into modern processors to dynamically observe the hardware related
activities in a system. There are some recent works [14], [15] which use these
HPCs to detect malicious programs targeted for a particular system. The HPCs
can be monitored dynamically using the well-known perf tool, available in Linux
kernels 2.6.31 and above. One interesting property of the perf tool is that a user
can observe the performance counters associated with a system with some time
interval, thereby giving the benefit of observing the system behavior continu-
ously in a succession of time. The command to monitor a particular HPC event
for a specific executable in such way is as follows:
perf stat -e <event name> -I <time interval> <executable name>
The range of HPC events those can be monitored using the perf tool is more
than 1000. However, in most of the Linux based systems, the perf tool is limited
to observing a maximum of 6 to 8 hardware events in parallel depending on the
processor type. Moreover, some of the events are not even supported by all the
processors. Our objective, in this work, is to detect the presence of ransomwares,
which mainly contain an encryption program, typically involving both symmetric
and asymmetric key encryptions. Hence, we selected the hardware events which
are more likely to change because of the encryptions and are supported in most
3 We term regular execution pattern of an uncompromised system as normal behavior,
which captures all the daily operations of benign executables assuming none of them
are ransomwares. We do not consider the execution patterns of high-computation
programs within normal behavior, as ransomwares, which are also high-computation
programs, may be missed by the detection framework by doing so.
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(a) # Branch Instructions (b) # Branch Misses (c) # Cache Misses
(d) # Cache References (e) # Instructions
Fig. 1. Variation of Performance Counter Events in presence of Wannacry Ransomware
of the processors. The hardware events selected for our study are instruction,
cache-references, cache-misses, branches, and branch-misses. The events
are self-explanatory by their names. Generally, the symmetric encryption affects
the cache based events while the asymmetric encryptions affect the instruction
and branching events.
In order to represent the prototype of normal system behavior, we designed
a watchdog program executable and collected the perf stat values with 10ms
time interval4 for that executable. We collected these values at the different
point of time in the target system and created a dataset of regular observation.
The effects of all the other processes including the ransomwares running in the
system will have an impact on the performance counters values. We articulate
that any behavior which is not close to this dataset is unusual activity, but may
not be a malicious one.
We show the effect of a Ransomware Program (for example, a WannaCry) on
the HPC values in Fig. 1. The blue lines in Figure represent the effect of normal
system programs on the watchdog executable for different HPCs, whereas the
orange lines show the effect of WannaCry ransomware.
An important point to be observed is that for a particular interval of time
the behavior of WannaCry ransomware does not change much from the normal
system behavior. For example, around time interval of 100, as shown in Fig. 2(a),
the effect of WannaCry on the hardware event branch misses is same as normal
system behavior. However, if we consider a window of a specific length, as shown
in Fig. 2(b), the behavior of WannaCry is more distinguishable from normal
4 The minimum interval of time after which the perf tool is allowed to sample a data
point is 10ms. We have selected the minimum time-interval to sample data as fast
as allowed, to enhance the mechanism in terms of detection time.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Importance of observing data-points within a window instead of single data-
point for decision making considering HPC values for the event branch-misses
observation. So, instead of considering individual points for decision making, we
select a window of observations considering each of the five events collectively.
Thus, we transform the problem into anomaly detection in multivariate time-
series data.
2.2 Learning a Time-Series Data Using an Autoencoder
In order to present a generalized ransomware detection strategy, we avoid mod-
eling the behavior of ransomwares as there can be a potential new one whose
behavior is unknown. Instead, we model the normal system behavior, as we can
get a majority of such instances. Another advantage of detecting anomalies by
modeling normal behavior is that we do not need the necessity of labeled dataset
as any activity with unusual behavior crossing an empirically calculated thresh-
old value can be detected as an anomaly. Thus, we propose an unsupervised
approach to detect these anomalies. We have already seen that HPC values ob-
served over the watchdog application is considered as the time-series data. An
LSTM (Long-Short-Term-Memory) based autoencoder can efficiently implement
the unsupervised anomaly detection for time-series, which we discuss below.
Autoencoder is a Deep Artificial Neural Network used for efficient coding of
the input space by unsupervised learning. The primary goal of an autoencoder is
to induce a representation for a set of data by learning an approximate identity
function, i.e., if the input data is X , the goal of the autoencoder is to learn the
function f , given by - f : X → X
An autoencoder always consists of two mapping, encoding and decoding,
which are given as φ and ψ respectively. φ : X → F , ψ : F → X
where F is a vector referring to the decisive intermediate representation
learned by the autoencoder, which is used to regenerate the original input data.
The error incurred by the autoencoder to regenerate the input from vector F is
termed as Reconstruction Error, which is given as: L = ‖X − (ψ ◦ φ)X‖2
The goal of the autoencoder is to minimize these reconstruction error for all
the input samples, i.e., to find the mappings φ and ψ such that L is minimum.
arg min
φ,ψ
L = arg min
φ,ψ
‖X − (ψ ◦ φ)X‖2 (1)
In our case, the input X is a multivariate time-series sequence, and the objec-
tive is to learn the structure of the sequence. LSTM networks, belonging to a class
of Recurrent Neural Network Model, are typically used for modeling sequence
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data, which efficiently handles the dependencies within the sequence. Hence,
we use the LSTM based autoencoder for our detection purpose. The anomaly
detector model first takes a multivariate input sequence (X ), generates an inter-
mediate feature vector (F) related to the sequence, and then reconstructs the
same sequence from the intermediate feature vector. The autoencoder is trained
using all the input sequences of regular observation by following the objective
function mentioned in Equation (1).
The training dataset is constructed from the observed data for normal system
behavior by taking a window of 100 trace points5 (i.e., a window trace points
collected over 1 second, since each interval data is collected after 10ms). We
shift the window by one time-interval (i.e., 10ms) repeatedly to consider con-
secutive 100 sample point for learning. Once the learning of intermediate vector
F is completed, for an anomalous sequence, the autoencoder makes an attempt
to reconstruct the original input sequence. Thus, the autoencoder maps it to
the normal sequence, based on the intermediate feature vector F . There is an
inherent information loss in this process and hence will incur a substantial re-
construction error. Next, we quantify the amount of error to be incurred by a
process to be termed as an anomaly.
2.3 Determining Threshold for the Decision
In order to quantify the threshold for detecting anomalous activities, we calculate
the reconstruction error distribution (R) for all the samples in normal behav-
ior. According to the 3σ rule of thumb, all these values should lie within three
standard deviations of the mean. Hence, we set the threshold for reconstruction
error (Rt) as below. Rt = µR + 3 ∗ σR (2)
where µR and σR are the mean and standard deviation of distribution R. In
our experimental setup Rt came out to be 5.38× 10−6.
2.4 Anomalous Behaviors of Ransomwares
In our study, we considered four ransomware programs - namely WannaCry,
Vipasana, Locky, and Petya to show the impact of selecting the threshold Rt in
detecting them as anomalies. Fig. 3 shows the sequence of reconstruction errors
for these ransomwares. The first point on these plots represents the first window
of 100 time-interval (equivalently 1 second). The successive points come after
each interval of 10ms as we slide by one time-interval for calculating the next
reconstruction error. The blue line indicates the reconstruction errors of each
window whereas the red line signifies the threshold Rt as calculated before.
We can observe from Fig. 3(a)6, the execution of WannaCry starts behaving
like a regular program (since the reconstruction errors lie well below the threshold
value), but the reconstruction error shoots over the threshold at 432nd observa-
tion. Thus, the WannaCry is detected as anomaly (1000+431∗10) = 5310 ms or
5.31 seconds after the start of execution. Whereas, from Fig. 3(b), Fig. 3(c), and
Fig. 3(d), we can observe that the ransomwares Vipasana, Locky, and Petya are
5 The window size of 100 is chosen empirically.
6 The embedded image in the box is the zoomed version of the same dataset for the
first 1500 window data.
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(a) WannaCry (b) Vipasana
(c) Locky (d) Petya
Fig. 3. Sequence of Reconstruction Errors for Ransomware in Autoencoder 1
detected as an anomaly at the first window itself, i.e., 1 second after the start of
execution. In all these cases there is an extra overhead of time due to the testing
time associated with the Autoencoder, which we discuss in Section 7.
3 How Good is Reconstruction Error as a Decider?
In the previous section, we suggested that a threshold as high as Rt can be used
to decide whether a particular process behavior deviates from the normal system
behavior significantly. In this section, we explain why a single decision step is
not enough to claim that the anomaly observed is from a malicious process.
3.1 Understanding the Ambiguity
In order to test the robustness of our detection scheme, we incorporate an analy-
sis in presence of SPEC2006 server and multimedia benchmarks. We consider the
Gshare predictor implementation as provided in https : //www.jilp.org/jwac−
2/cbp3 framework instructions.html and observe the HPC sampling counts
from a background process exactly like our previous setting. Fig. 4 presents the
variation of different hardware events in the presence of both SPEC benchmarks
and WannaCry ransomware. We can observe that the execution behaviors for
both the programs are significantly different from the normal observations. Thus,
the sequences of data for the SPEC programs may also create considerable re-
construction errors. Fig. 5 clearly shows that the reconstruction error for the
sequences in the presence of the SPEC benchmark programs is above the prede-
termined threshold at the first window itself. Though the error is very close to
the threshold, this essentially raises an alarm to RAPPER that this benchmark
program is a potentially malicious program which deviates to an extent from
the normal system behavior. But surely, in this case, it is a false alarm, since
the benchmark is composed of server and multimedia benchmarks and can be
8 M. Alam et al.
(a) # Branch Instructions (b) # Branch Misses (c) # Cache Misses
(d) # Cache References (e) # Instructions
Fig. 4. Comparison of the Effects on Performance Event Counters from HPCs in pres-
ence of Wannacry Ransomware and SPEC Benchmark Programs
considered as the representative of the high computational processes which may
deviate highly from the normal running processes in a system.
In the next subsection, we perform a transformation from the time domain to
frequency domain to differentiate actual malicious processes from false positives.
3.2 Introducing Fast Fourier Transformation
In the second phase of detection using RAPPER, we transform the traces from
the time domain to the frequency domain using the Fast Fourier Transformation
(FFT). FFT is the most efficient way to implement the Discrete Fourier Trans-
formation. The primary reason to convert the analysis from the time domain
to the frequency domain is to understand the repetitive pattern of the traces.
The ransomware executable runs encryption repeatedly on multiple files thus it
repeats the same set of operations of opening a file, encrypting and closing the
file followed by deleting it for multiple files one after another. The transforma-
tion is illustrated in Fig. 6, which typically indicates that the amplitudes for
Fig. 5. Sequence of Reconstruction Errors for SPEC Benchmark in Autoencoder 1
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(a) Branch Instructions (b) Branch Misses (c) Cache Misses
(d) Cache References (e) Instructions
Fig. 6. Variation of Amplitude in frequency domain of the performance counters from
HPCs in the presence of SPEC observation and Wannacry Ransomware
each frequency bins are constantly higher for the ransomware in contrary to the
SPEC benchmark.
We have applied FFT on the time domain values for different hardware
events as mentioned in Section 2.1, to obtain the frequency domain values. Fig. 6
presents the FFT plots for the normal system measurements in blue lines, along
with the SPEC Observations in green lines and WannaCry Ransomware in or-
ange lines for different hardware events. Fig. 6 shows that for most of the hard-
ware events (apart from the cache misses), the FFT plot behavior of the SPEC
benchmark overlaps exactly with the FFT of the normal system behavior. Also,
it is quite clear from Fig. 6(a), Fig. 6(b), Fig. 6(d), and Fig. 6(e) that the ampli-
tudes of almost all the frequency bins are higher for WannaCry than the SPEC
observation, which is eminent as the WannaCry program repeatedly encrypts
multiple files.
The detection of these variations of amplitudes for different frequency bins
can again be considered as a time-series data, and an LSTM based autoencoder,
as discussed before, can be used to detect the anomaly. The amplitudes for SPEC
benchmark programs are very close to that of regular observations for most of
the hardware events. Thus, modeling the FFT data for regular sequences using
an autoencoder will result in reconstruction errors close to the threshold (sayR′t)
for SPEC benchmarks, and the error will be much higher in case of ransomwares
because of the repeated encryptions. We modeled another autoencoder following
the procedure mentioned before with the FFT transformed data and calculated
the threshold R′t to be 0.002829. Fig. 7 presents the sequence of reconstruc-
tion errors for both SPEC and ransomware programs and we can verify that
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(a) SPEC (b) WannaCry (c) Vipasana
(d) Locky (e) Petya
Fig. 7. Sequence of Reconstruction Errors for SPEC Benchmark and different Ran-
somwares in Autoencoder 2
the reconstruction errors of SPEC programs always lie below the threshold and
thus discarded as false positives, whereas the reconstruction errors of all the
ransomware programs always remain higher to the threshold7.
Need of Both the Autoencoders One interesting point that may arise in this
detection framework is that what is the requirement of both the autoencoders,
when it is obvious from the fact that Autoencoder 2 is sufficient enough to dis-
card the ransomwares. Autoencoder 2 takes the FFT converted values of the
window data, and the FFT conversion requires some time for the computation.
Hence, to reduce the computational complexity of the detection framework we
apply a first level filter in terms of Autoencoder 1 to remove the less computa-
tional heavy programs in the first stage itself and apply the FFT transformation
and Autoencoder 2 for the anomalous data arising from this stage.
In the next section, we present an analysis on the performance of both the
autoencoders in the presence of a standard benign Linux benchmark.
4 Performance on Standard Linux Benchmark
In this section, we consider a standard Linux benchmark CHStone [6] to ana-
lyze the efficiency of both the autoencoders. CHStone is Linux benchmark suite
which represents various application domains such as arithmetic, media process-
ing, and security. Hence, it would be intriguing to evaluate the performance of
the detection scheme in the presence of this benchmark suite. The sequence of re-
construction errors for both the autoencoders in this scenario is shown in Fig. 8.
We can easily observe from Fig. 8(a) that in most of the cases the error value in
7 The reconstruction error for Petya on the first window is lower than the threshold,
but for the subsequent windows the error is always higher than the threshold.
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(a) Autoencoder 1 (b) Autoencoder 2
Fig. 8. Sequence of Reconstruction Errors on the CHStone benchmark.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 9. Sequence of Reconstruction Errors for Disk Encryption Programs in both the
Autoencoders. (a) TrueCrypt in Autoencoder 1, (b) VeraCrypt in Autoencoder 1, (c)
TrueCrypt in Autoencoder 2, (d) VeraCrypt in Autoencoder 2
the first autoencoder is lower than the threshold. However, in some of the cases,
the error is higher (i.e., it is detected as an anomaly), but the reconstruction
error, as shown in Fig. 8(b), in the second autoencoder is always lower than the
threshold (except at some specific time interval). We can hypothesize from this
example that, if the reconstruction error in both the autoencoders are constantly
higher for some specific time we conclude that behavior as anomaly instead of
considering a single peak. We have also experimented with two other benchmarks
such as Unix-Bench [1] and LMBench [12], and the results are similar in nature.
5 Identifying Disk Encryption from Ransomwares
The Disk Encryption processes are very similar in operation to the malicious
ransomware processes. Both of these processes access files frequently and en-
crypt them one after another, though the intentions of the processes are entirely
different. While designing RAPPER, one of the most significant challenges is
to differentiate the disk encryption processes from malicious ones. Also, there
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are some ransomwares which uses disk encryption program as their encryption
engine. This typically puts the security engineers in a very delicate state. In our
paper, we will be discussing how the disk encryption programs differs from the
ransomware processes which does not use disk encryption as their intermediate
software routine. This detection module helps us to differentiate the disk en-
cryption modules from the general set of ransomware programs. Later we use
this detection module to demonstrate a reasonable solution to this problem of
ransomware detection.
In order to manifest the problem, we consider two popular disk encryption
processes in our study, namely TrueCrypt, and VeraCrypt. The behavior of both
the processes in both the autoencoders are shown in Fig. 9. We can easily see from
the figure that, both the disk encryption processes are detected as ransomwares
by RAPPER. One naive solution is to check the privilege of the current process
under suspicion. Since the disk encryption processes can only be run by the
administrator with the highest privilege, checking the privilege of the running
application can be a quick check to determine whether the target process is
malicious or not.
In this paper, however, we have also delved into the harder problem of dif-
ferentiating these two sets of processes by looking at the nature of the HPC
event values. All the popular disk encryption processes use AES-XTS8 mode of
encryption for their operations. We utilize this characteristic to template the
operation of a disk encryption process, and in the online phase, we check for
whether the suspicious program is a disk encryption process or not. In order to
find similarity with the stored template, we calculate the cumulative correlation
of it with the suspicious process. If the correlation is high for a successive interval
of time, we conclude that the process is a disk encryption process and allow it
to execute in the system.
The watchdog program generates a successive window of multivariate data
with significantly different amplitude values for various applications. Instead
of using complex multivariate correlation, we use the univariate reconstruction
error from the Autoencoder 1 for the simple Pearson’s correlation to make the
detection less computationally expensive and with less storage requirement. We
store the template of reconstruction errors for a disk encryption process instead
of multivariate window data and correlate it with the reconstruction errors of
the unknown process.
In order to demonstrate the approach we use reconstruction errors of True-
Crypt as our template, and present the cumulative correlation values with Ve-
raCrypt and other ransomwares in Fig. 10. We can easily observe that the cor-
relation values of VeraCrypt are high for a successive interval of time, whereas,
the correlation values for all the ransomwares converges to a very low value.
Hence, we conclude that it is easy to differentiate the behavior of disk encryp-
tion programs from ransomwares with the hypothesis that most of the popular
disk encryption programs use the same mode of encryptions in their operations.
8 AES XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing.
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Fig. 10. Cumulative Correlation of Veracrypt disk encryption and Ransomware pro-
cesses with another disk encryption process TrueCrypt
Comprehensive detection and temporary suspension of disk Encryp-
tion Processes The discussion in the previous section shows that a particular
mode of encryption can be differentiated with high confidence if the HPC events
are monitored in an efficient manner. This identification specifically means that
all disk encryption algorithms running AES in XTS mode can be differenti-
ated from the general genre of malicious ransomware programs which have no
disk encryption sub-routine in them. Though as mentioned earlier, their exists
some ransomware like MAMBA which uses disk encryption modules so as to
maliciously encrypt process. Our detection module as described in the previous
subsection can successfully identify that whether a disk encryption module is
running in the background but it turns out that the disk encryption could also
be a part of ransomware operation. In this paper, we propose a solution to this
problem by temporary suspending the suspected disk encryption program. This
temporary suspension of the disk encryption program raises an alarm to the
user and waits for a confirmation from the user whether the suspected program
is actually launched by the user. This confirmation will automatically resume
the disk encryption module intended to run from the user’s end but not the
unintended ones which gets launched by the ransomware modules.
In the next section, we discuss in details the overall detection strategy of
RAPPER with a flow diagram.
6 Architecture of RAPPER
In this section, we present an overview of the architecture of proposed detec-
tion methodology - RAPPER. The basic diagram of the system is shown in
Fig. 11. All the experimentation for this study have been performed in a sand-
box environment, such that the ransomwares do not affect the actual file system.
The architecture contains five modules: Watchdog Program, Autoencoder 1, FFT
Converter, Autoencoder 2, and Correlation Module. The detection methodology
works in two phases, namely Offline Phase and Online Phase. The functioning
of each module in both the phases are described below:
6.1 Offline Phase
In the offline phase, the detection methodology is trained with the normal behav-
ior of the sandbox environment, such that any unusual activity of a ransomware
is properly detected in real-time scenario. The functioning of each of the modules
in this phase are described below.
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Fig. 11. Detection Methodology of RAPPER
1. Watchdog Program: Monitors the HPCs of the Sandbox Environment continuously
and forwards a window of data to the Autoencoder 1 and the FFT Converter in
parallel.
2. Autoencoder 1 : Trains an autoencoder with the dataset forwarded by watchdog
program. This module also forwards reconstruction error corresponding to a disk
encryption process to the correlation module directly9.
3. FFT Converter : Computes Fast Fourier Transformation of each window forwarded
by watchdog program and passes the results to the Autoencoder 2.
4. Autoencoder 2 : Collects all the data passed by the FFT Converter and trains
another autoencoder based on the FFT dataset.
5. Correlation Module: Stores reconstruction errors corresponding to a disk encryp-
tion for analysis in the Online Phase.
6.2 Online Phase
In the online phase, the detection module is deployed in the sandbox system for
real-time monitoring to detect ransomwares. The functioning of each modules
for an unknown process in this phase are discussed below.
1. Watchdog Program: Monitors the system and forwards data to the Autoencoder 1.
In this phase, watchdog program does not forward data to the FFT converter for
run-time monitoring the system with lower computational cost.
2. Autoencoder 1 : Calculates reconstruction error of the data received from watchdog
program. If the error is higher than the predefined threshold Rt, it sends a signal to
the watchdog program to transmit the same window to the FFT Converter. Oth-
erwise, the process is allowed to execute in the system. This module also forwards
the data to correlation module directly, irrespective of it being lesser or more than
the threshold value.
9 Behavior of disk encryption is not included in the training as this may produce false
negatives for ransomwares since both are repeated encryption process. The errors
due to disk encryption are calculated after the training is completed.
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3. FFT Converter : Converts the data received from watchdog program into frequency
domain, and forwards the transformed data to the Autoencoder 2, but with a
condition imposed by the Autoencoder 1 module.
4. Autoencoder 2 : Calculates the reconstruction error of the received FFT data, and
if the error is higher than the predefined threshold, R′t, it sends a signal to the
correlation module to check for its correlation with the template of disk encryp-
tion process. Otherwise, the process is considered as simply a high computational
process and is allowed to execute in the system.
5. Correlation Module: Calculates the cumulative correlation of the unknown process
with the known disk encryption process. If the correlation is low for a considerable
duration of time, then the process is considered as a Ransomware and is terminated
from the system, else it is forwarded to the user for verification as a legitimate disk
encryption process.
In the next section, we analyze the efficiency of RAPPER in terms of detec-
tion time of ransomwares and implementation overhead.
7 Evaluating the performance of RAPPER
We performed all the experiments in a sandbox system having specification
Intel Core i3 M350 running Linux 4.10.0-38-generic kernel. We used popular
open source python based neural network library Keras [2] for the implementa-
tion of both the autoencoders.
The FFT converter usually takes 0.0003 milliseconds to convert a sequence
within a window into frequency domain. The model building times for Autoen-
coder 1 and Autoencoder 2 are on average 10 and 14 minutes respectively. Test-
ing time to calculate whether a single window is an anomaly or not is 1.321
milliseconds for Autoencoder 1 and 1.699 milliseconds for Autoencoder 2 re-
spectively. As shown in the Architecture of RAPPER in Fig. 11, the testing of a
regular observation only passes through the Autoencoder 1, thereby taking only
1.699 milliseconds, and an anomalous observation passes through all the three
modules: Autoencoder 1, FFT Converter, and Autoencoder 2, thereby taking
1.321 + 0.0003 + 1.699 = 3.0203 milliseconds to be detected. The time to cor-
relate two reconstruction errors from Autoencoder 1 and the stored error trace
is on an average 0.0001 milliseconds, which will be calculated only for either
disk encryption or ransomwares. In both the cases of regular and anomalous
observation, the detection time is less than the sampling interval, which is 10
milliseconds. Hence, the detection is performed seamlessly, without the need of
any storage buffer, as a new window of data will be created after 10 milliseconds.
Without loss of generality, we present here the calculation of detection time
for most recent WannaCry ransomware by RAPPER. As shown in Section 2.3,
the WannaCry is detected as an anomaly at the 432nd window and instantly
detected as ransomware at the same time because it’s reconstruction error is
always higher than the threshold of Autoencoder 2. Hence, the total time taken
to detect WannaCry as a repeated encryption process is equal to (Time taken to
generate the first window) + 431 * (time interval for each sample) + (Autoen-
coder 1 testing time) + (Time for single FFT Conversion) + (Autoencoder 2
testing time) = 1000 + 431 ∗ 10 + 1.321 + 0.0003 + 1.699 millisecond = 5313.0203
milliseconds. Thus, WannaCry is detected by RAPPER as a repeated encryp-
tion process in approximately 5.313 seconds. We can check the privilege of the
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Fig. 12. Notion of File Recovery using Linux mlock(). (a) Let there are 4 files which
are opened within a specific time quantum. (b) Backup these files with Linux mlock()
command (marked with green color). (c) Let ransomware encrypts 3 files before being
detected by RAPPER (marked with red color). (d) We can easily retrieve the encrypted
files from the backup.
program and terminate it instantly as ransomware does not have administrator
privilege. However, the correlation module discriminates it from the disk encryp-
tion process from 1002nd window, as shown in Fig. 10. So, for confirming it as a
ransomware program, by correlation, it takes almost extra 5 seconds of execution
time. Since, at this stage we check for a suspicious ransomware process, we can
always pause the execution of such process and resume it after the verification.
As a sample run with RAPPER, out of 10000 files of approximately 21 bytes
each, when the detection stops the execution, 68 files are encrypted. It maybe
noted that, the size of a typical file is much larger than 21 bytes, and hence, a
lesser number of files will be encrypted.
8 File Recovery and Conclusions
RAPPER is thus capable of detecting the presence of ransomwares fast, as we
show for the case of WannaCry within a time of approximately 5 sec from its
launch. Depending on the latency, the malware can encrypt a few files (say n).
We conclude with a suggested approach for data retrieval. A practical solution
would be to take backups of the n-recently opened files. After the lapse of the
time quantum required to encrypt these files, we delete the copies if RAPPER
raises no ransomware alarm. This minimizes the storage requirement for the
backup files. To further ensure that the backup files are not encrypted we perform
locking operation, like in Linux using mlock(). A basic idea of this approach is
presented in Fig. 12, which shows the operation of Linux mlock() in order to
recover the encrypted files in presence of the ransomware.
In this paper, we provide a detailed understanding on the effect of ran-
somware on normal system behaviors. We take the aid of the Artificial Neu-
ral Network to detect the presence of ransomwares using a two-step detection
framework. The entire detection procedure does not need any template of the
malicious process from beforehand. Instead it thrives on an anomaly detection
procedure to detect the infectious ransomwares in as less as 5 seconds with al-
most zero false positives, using a frequency analysis.
We also explored the opportunity of applying side channel techniques to
recover the secret key used to encrypt the files from the perf statistics. We
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found for ransomwares like WannaCry; each file is encrypted using AES-128
CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) with a randomly generated distinct key. These
keys are in turn encrypted using an infection specific RSA public key and stored
in the memory. It would be indeed a challenging exercise to recover the AES key
by targeting the AES CBC operation. However, we leave that as a future scope
of work.
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